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[ABSTRACT 
The question of the definition of "science" in 
this context. and the nature and object of the work 
of the political scIentist. Academic roles and 
responsibility in the field of practical politics are 
not separable, and the political scientist has no 
sovereign control of his" ma,terial ", but is partially 
subjected to environmental influences. Schools of 
thought, scepticism .and empiricism, and the weak-
nesses of modern political science. Confusion with 
the princ,iples of natural science; the example of 
H. D. Lasswell. Behavioural scientists and modern 
trends.l 
Science according to my dictionary, is "know-
ledge systematically arranged ", and, after dealing 
with the definition of applied, natural and pure 
science 1t adds the obitur dictum that political 
economy is known as "the dismal science". Now 
the fusion of political and economic studies was 
the first st.ep taken in the 19th century, in the 
evolution of the modern academic discipline which 
has become known as Political Science, and there 
are those today, like Prof. Hans Morgenthau in his 
"Dilemmas of Politics" (Univ. of Chicago Press, 
1958) who argue that at the present time Political 
Science is often as dismal a subject as political 
economy once became. Yet political science is as 
old at least as Plato's " Academy" or as Aristotle's 
eternally modern works on politics and ethics, and 
indeed if ever this subject becomes a dull, or a 
dismal science, it must be because the methods, the 
objects, and the imagination of poutical scientists 
are irrelevant or incomprehensible to the people 
they ought to be addressing. 
Doubts are often expressed about Political 
Science, and questions are raised as to whether it 
is a science at all. Some academicians cloak their 
uncertainty about it by calling the University 
departments in which it is studied Departments 
of Political Studies, or even more broadly Depart-
ments of Social Studies, the word "science" is 
tacitly dropped. Politics, they say, IS an art; and 
tt is an aspect of life whiCh is too unpredictable 
and too intractable to the application of seientific 
methods of analysis, to qualify as a science. But 
these propositions of course are based upon a mis-
understanding of the word 'science', which, we 
have seen, in its general meaning is knowledge 
systematically arranged; but again, as the 
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(Publication No. 426, Paris, 1950) indicated in 1950, 
this systemat,ic arrangement could apply to 
" acquired know1edge verified by accurate observa-
tion and logical thought ", or more broadly to 
",the sum of co-ordinated knowledge relative to a 
determined subject ", which would make empirical 
verification less necessary to Ithe systematisation of 
knowledge (ibid, p. 3). In concluding that the 
latter definition should apply to the UNESCO panel 
of scholars who contributed to the Survey seemed 
to be saying that Political Science is not perfectly 
scientific in so far as strIct empirical verification 
is not always necessary to it, and that this was 
certainly borne out When methodology in political 
science was examined. Experts in the methodology 
of political science, the authors of the Survey re-
ported, "are wont to speak of a variety of 
methods: philosophical, dialectIcal, juridical, histor-
ical, sociological, psychologic-ai, economic and 
normative methods, methods of liberty and of the 
natuml sciences, experimental, integral and sta-
tistical methods, &c.", and they lamented that" the 
outstanding feature of this terminology is perhaps 
its ambiguity". (ibid, p. 3-4). That would seem to 
be the understatement of the year. At any rate, no 
politic'al scientist would appear ,to have mastered 
all these methods, and not all have agreed that 
some of them are proper in the field of political 
science. All political scientists show, however, their 
individual predeliction for methods seleoted for 
their propriety in the study of particular interests 
and, to be really outstanding, have to show great 
a.bility in handling interdisciplinary skills. No 
wonder, therefore, that the first professor of 
political science in the University of Oambridge 
remarked in his inaugural lecure in 1928 "that 
many of his hearers regarded the subject of his 
chair as 'certainly nebulous, probably dubious 'and 
possibly disputatious'''. (W. A. Robson, The Uni-
vers1ty Teaching of Social Sciences: Political 
Science, UNESCO, 1954, p. 16). 
Not only to the uninitiate, then, would it seem 
that political scientists cannot even agree upon the 
scope or set limits to their 'alleged discipline, or 
indeed to the object of its study. Indeed, for 
Maurice Cowling of Jesus College at Cambridge, 
political science as an academic discipline is non-
existent. " Political Science ", he writes (The Nature 
and Limits of Political Science, Cambridge, 1963, 
pp. 209-210--cf. p. Iff) "the taking thought to 
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deal with each situation by hypothesis and experi-
ment ", he calls it, " is ... in an academic setting, 
an impossibility. In an academic setting," he went 
on, "hypotheses are tools for the further elucida-
tion of a subject matter and they have no relev-
ance to anything else. Political explanation exists 
here as philosophy and history, and nothing else. 
Political science, sociology, social administration, 
internartional relations, criminology, comparative 
institutions and comparative government, when 
looked at critically, dissolve into these two disci-
plines: and if they do not, they have not been 
looked art critically enough." And, he goes on, " The 
only political scIence, in this sense, goes on in the 
world of practice and the only political scient,ists 
are ministers and members of parliament, ambas-
sadors and heads of department, kings, princes, 
citizens and revolutionaries who are, like historians, 
physicists and philosophers, responsible for the 
subject matter on which they work. Professors of 
Political Science ", he added, "who want to engage 
in political practice (by standing for Parliament, 
writing in newspapers, advising governments or 
joining the City Council) 'are free to do so. But they 
are, so far as they do this, abandoning their aca-
demic function for a prac,tical political one. To do 
so may, if they are lucky, help them to illuminate 
the academic subject matter. But the only raJtional 
action to which scholars, as scholars, are committed, 
the only moral action to which they are com-
manded and the only 'social responsibility' to 
which their professional posttion compels them, is 
to use their energies in order to explain in its full 
diversity as much as they can of the nature of the 
world in which they live." 
This is, perhaps, a view which would be agreeable 
to many. But Dr. Cowling is to my mind not en-
tirely convincing. The distinction between :the 
scholar and the pmctitioner is not an absolute one, 
as he at least suggests, but moreover explanation, 
as he, in fact, says (p. 210) "is a form of action ". 
It is never explanation for its own sake, but for 
some purpose; and to say that one explains for 
ac,ademic reasons is nonsense, or at any rate it 
confuses the method with the object. Explanation, 
I would argue, comes about when a question be-
comes significant, and the kind of questlon asked 
by political scientists is always subjective to the 
age and place in which it is put. But secondly it 
it always asked for a purpose. Thus one may ask 
" How does the constiltution of, let us say, Britain, 
or the U.N. work? " not simply with a view to ex-
plaining its parts, but in order to exercise judge-
ment; for some end. Does it work properly, effici-
ently, is it satisfactory in carrying out the purpose 
for which it came into being? And willy nilly, 
implicitly or explicitly, the scholar wHl ask what 
may be done to it to make it serve its purpose 
better? Or whether indeed its purpose ought to be 
changed? Thus even academic explanation is a 
social and a political act. It only has force and 
significance, of course, if it is seen to be relevant to 
actual problems of life, and in the field of political 
science that means in practical political life. The 
difference between the academic political scientist 
and political practitioner is, then, that the first 
when properly so called, in contradistinction to the 
second, applies his mind without undue restraint of 
loyalty to party rules or particular political ideo-
logies, to explain particular or general problems in 
order to discover the truth and to serve mankind. 
He undel'takes research, and he teaches. And 
teachmg is never simply the passing on of in-
formation or of explanation but a process of train-
ing people to use judgement, and the use of judge-
ment means the seeking out of criteria of right and 
wrong, of excellence and of inferiority. It is, in 
short, also a process of character forma,tion as well 
as of intellectual training. Political scientists are 
involved, in fact, not only in explanation but also 
in making. They may inform official opinion, guide 
public opinion, and dil'ect throUgh widening circles 
through schools and professional assodations and 
societies the attention of administrators and poli-
ticians to principles and practices which deserve 
rejection, modification, or aeceptance, because one 
of these things will make the governmenta,l and the 
social system more just, mow efficient or more 
economical. Moreover, nowadays not infrequently, 
academic political scientists, like academic econ-
omists, are formally called in to provide profes-
sional or technical advice to government depart-
ments or international specialised agencies, or they 
are employed to undertake special surveys and 
compile official reports. In all this activity they 
a,re involved in an increasing responsibility in 
policy formulation and creating a consensus of 
opinion on vital ma;tters in national and inter-
national affairs. Thus Charles Merriam said with 
some truth some forty years ago that (New Aspects 
of Politics, University of Chicago, 1925). political 
scientists are more than concerned with the 
methodology and scope of social research, they 
are concerned with social formation or as some 
would put it, 'social engineering '; and he added 
thait " We might make the coming generation aris-
tocrats, democrats, communists, nationalists, or in-
ternationalists at will, assuming that we were pre-
pa.red to devote the necessary time and patience 
to the construction of the machinery for the 
purpose of social and political education", (p. 203). 
Nor does he mean only secondary and tertiary 
education, but the constant re-educatiol1 of the 
citizens (p. 206). "The public opinion ", he says, 
"that rests chiefly upon tradition and custom, or 
upon transparent rationalisations of interest, or 
upon ignorance of fundamental relations between 
economic and social interests and political action 
can no longer be reckoned as an adequate basis for 
a government". (p. 209). He had in mind then 
an applied science of politics and of government, just as, indeed, had Aristotle. 
In his vIews, though, Prof. Merriam over-
emphasises perhaps the role of the political 
scientists for, as Aristotle was the first to point out, 
the manners and minds of men are formed by 
three factors, nature, habit and ra1tionality 
(Politics, Bk. VII, para. 1332b), and it is not easy, 
as all political and social stUdies testify, to bring 
these .three determinants of action into harmony 
with each other. This indeed is the central problem 
of the political scientist. 
Nor indeed, as a further comment upon Prof. 
Merriam's argument, is the political scientist a 
sovereign educator, for" It is", Maurice Gowling 
wrote, "the whole of the education and the whole 
of a religion that a man has, not just his refiective 
philosophy, which determines what part he sees 
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of the world and what he will think it necessary 
to do in it", (p. 208), and in this sense neither 
the academic political scientist nor the practitioner 
of scientific politics has full control of his material. 
But the difficulties of the political scientist do 
not stop there. For it should be transparently clear 
that the political scientist is himself a creature of 
nature, habit and rationality, and though his 
natuml self may be under a wide measure of com-
mand because of disciplined and civilised habits 
and because of the intense individualism which 
springs from the cultivation of a questioning and 
rational approach to the problems of life, yet h~s 
mind and nature will still be profoundly affected 
by the social and intellectual community in which 
he lives. And in that cont.ext too, what work he 
does will reflect at least a compromise between his 
free will and the expectations or demands of his 
society. Thus it is that there 'are national schools 
of political science: Prof. Hans Morgenthau argues 
that American departments of political science 
"were established . . . not for the purpose of 
theoretical understanding, let alone philosophical 
speculation, but primarily for meeting the practical 
exigencies of the day", that is to provide admin-
istrators, and to train practical politicians. This, 
he said, was the limit of expectaMon placed upon 
American colleges and universities in an age which 
cherished only the utilitarian (Dilemmas, pp. 9fL). 
On the other hand, German poUtical science, it is 
sometimes claimed, is expressive of the traditions 
of German legal science, and French of the Roman 
legal tradition; and in the Soviet Union, under the 
impact of Marxism, "political science" (r.eports 
the UNESCO Survey) "is merely a secondary 
aspeet of sociology which is centred in political 
economy". (pp. 7-8). 
Political scientists, then, are subject to environ-
mental factors which not. only affect directly their 
intellectual freedom, as in totaUtarian states, but 
which more subtly condition their thinking accord-
ing to ,their degree of involvement in religious, 
political, or other movements and in their cultural 
environment, and also according to what might be 
called the interdisciplinary pressures which are 
current from time to time. Among ,these influences 
from other branches of learning at present would 
clearly be listed (1) demographic and ecological 
studies in a period of tremendous human popula-
tion growth; (2) sociological studies of populations 
in areas of rapid economic change when agricul-
tural science and industrialisation are introduced 
or where a continuing technological revolution is 
changing industrial, economic and administrative 
patterns, and consequently political behaviour; 
(3) military science, because the consequences for 
national politics and international relations of 
modern military weapons are so great; (4) econ-
omics, because, for example, the consequences in 
domestic politics of the attainment of the Welfare 
State and in international politics of the growing 
gap between States with affluent societies and those 
with struggling economics, urgently call for 
remedial steps by national governments and inter-
national agencies; and (5) anthropology, (taken 
in the widest sense of the Oxford English Diction-
ary as the 'Whole science of man '; and the 
'physiological and psychological science of man ',J 
because, int"r alia, the strict egalitarian principles 
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of 18th century European rationalist political 
theory have so generally been made the basis for 
political action when in fact differences between, 
on the one hand primitive societies and on the 
other' advanced' societies and also amongst ad-
vanced societies as such, makes political egalitari-
anism impracitical whether it is applied to indi-
viduals or to states. Besides it is evidently im-
possible to introduce it in some multi-racial states 
without actually introducing injustices which may 
be more sharply felt than the old ones. Con-
sequently, the political and administrative machin-
ery of government and also legal systems have to 
be carefully appraised and modified to avoid re-
newed or new tensions in modern states and be-
tween them. Sixthly, then, political science is also 
influenced by administration and legal science. 
Even in advanced societies, then, cultural heritages 
and what may be called inherent differentiating 
factors such as racial, religious, and geopolitical, as 
well as ideological considerations, control the pro-
cesses of question and answer, of the interpretation 
of legal and moral rules, and of social and political 
analyses made by policital scientists. 
Any such listing of influences to which political 
scientists are subjected, such as I have just 
attempted, emphasises the fact that their sub-
jectivity is broadly of two kinds: (1) they are 
thems.elves members of diverse societies, and their 
studies tend to reflect their inheritances as well as 
sometimes differing environmental problems; but 
(2) they live at present in a revolutionary age 
when much of their inheritance seems irrelevant 
to an understanding of their own times, or to 
salvation from fearful dangers foreseen in the 
future. Where political scientists perceive these 
antagonistic influences the order of questions which 
they ask undergoes profound changes, and at the 
same time a profound scepticism moves many of 
them to perhaps an extreme reliance upon em-
pirical testing so ,that political science withdraws 
itself from theoretieal explora,tion and speculative 
thinking and becomes for some at any rate a new 
dismal science concerned with the collection of 
data and its systema,tic arrangement, such as is 
indulged in by some scholars specialising for 
example, in the startistical analyses of elections. 
Or conversely ,the same disillusionment with re-
flective theory and established moral resources 
leads to the ma'thematical or formulative projec-
tion of ameliorative and allegedly practical pro-
grams of elective, political ;and administrative 
organisation without sufficiently taking into ac-
count that man's social behaviour and exercise of 
political choice rarely conforms to the objects of 
such programs. Thus some political scientists, to 
quote Morgenthau (op.cit. pg. 19), "retreat ever 
more from contact wi,th .the empirical world into 
a realm of self-sufficient abstractions ". This 
fault has been" aptly called", he says, the "new 
scholasticism" and what it does is Ito dissolve 
"the substance of knowledge into ,the processes 
of knowing; . . . to think about how to think, and 
to conceptualise about concepts". It means "re-
gressing ever further from empirical reality until " 
the patient (as one feels obliged to call this type 
of scholar) "finds the logical consummation of his 
endeavours in mathematical symbols and other 
formal relations. . . The apparent precision of his 
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cat.egories" Morgenthau then says, "tends to go 
hand in hand with 'an often shocking imprecision 
of his vestigal substantive thought; for, to the 
extent that objective reality demands qualitative 
evaluwtion, formalism either misses the pOint 
a1together or else distorts it". 
It is not surprising indeed, that many scholars, 
shocked out of the security given by traditions and 
beliefs which have been undermined, and dis-
illusioned 'about their ability to rest their learning 
upon sure religious or philosophical foundations, 
should ei,ther over-emphasise the empirical, or 
withdraw from both traditional speculation and 
empirical verification and escape into the exercise 
of what they might call pure avant garde rational-
ism. But the most rewarding part of modern 
political science is the development of empirical 
testing ,to prov,e the soundness of classical theories 
and app1ication of 'the results 't.o 'the reformulation 
of ideas in all fields of knowledge about mankind 
in order to smooth the path of adaptation to new 
orders of existence. Ideas and practice are there-
fore brought continually into a renewed and ap-
proximately harmonious relationship. 
I am reminded in this of the frustration which 
Bishop John Robinson reports is felt by many 
Christians whose lif,e of prayer and devotion is 
purely formal because their religious life is identi-
fied wiJtha, physic'al place (the church) and with a 
spiritual place (which is not of this world); and 
of his ,injunction that religion is a way of living 
here and now and prayer and devotion is per-
formed serving ones fellows in accordance with 
ones faith in God. (' Honest 'to God' by J. A. T. 
Robinson. IS.C.M. Press, 1963). 'The010gy anld 
exegesis are indeed sharing the shocks of our time 
which is revolutionising our knowledge of things 
and altering our methods of ascertaining the truth 
for our times in 'all fields of learning. And the 
fundamentally interesting thing is not the schol-
astic aberrations which ensure, but the reformu-
labion of the old and perhaps its evolutionary 
development, with a;t times some discarding of 
what is now not credible or needed and with some 
addition of knowledge and emphasis of what is 
now needed, in a way which revitalises faith and 
points to exciting prospects for research, planning 
and de>lelopment. In effect, in the social sciences 
as in theology and the experimental sciences, 
formalism whether in theory or practice is taking 
hard knocks, and theory and practice are being 
wedded together in action. Just as, then, religion 
is showing a tendency to come out of the pulpits 
into the streets so even more generally the poliitical 
scientist is coming out of his ivory 'tower to try 
his rationalism in the hard school of practical 
affairs. And it would sur,ely be wrong ,to accuse 
them of sacrificing political objectivity ,in doing 
so, for apart from the fact that experience may 
improve their objectivity it would be paradoxical 
to demand a self-denying ordinance from those 
who have devoted ,the most serious study to 
pOlitical life and institutions. It suffices only to say 
that of course the political scientist should recog-
nise his special responsibility in this matter, since, 
in the words .of Professor R. H. Brookes of Welling-
ton, "Precisely because he studies the subject 
seriously, people may give some weight to his 
remarks". Thus "to justify their attention, he 
must not merely ,achieve an understanding of the 
sys,tem he's criticising; he must also cultivate 
adequate standards of criticism", must draw, in-
deed, upon the masterpieces of political theory and 
make articulate anew "the assumptions on which 
alternative political systems may be based, thereby 
challenging one to clarifY,and perhaps to modify, 
the basic assumptions underlying ... (other) .. , 
political preferences". (R. H. Brooks, The Art of 
the POSSible, Inaugural Address, The Victoria Uni-
versity of Wellington, 1962, pg. 12,). 
Now, what we have established thus far in this 
lecture, is (1) that the political scientist is sub-jective to his environment, and that (2) he ought 
not to do his work esconced in an ivory tower, 
and thwt in fact he seems increasingly to work as 
one who does have in view the application of his 
adumbrations to real situations. He is then, no 
different from the physicists, chemists and others 
who also have to work from existant theories of 
energy and matter, and who are concerned with 
the advance of scientific knowledge for practical 
ends. Some have concluded in consequence that 
polit,ical scientists should go about their work in 
the same way. But the attempts of those who 
think of political science in the same terms as 
natural science hav,e lead ,to some unhappy results. 
This one may illustrate perhaps by quoting from 
the work of one of the most renowned of modern 
social scientists, Harold D. Lasswell, and consider-
ing wha't 'in faclt happened to him. "One aspect of 
the task of the systema,tic student of politics ", he 
wrote, "is to describe political behaviour in 'those 
social situations which recur with sufficient fre-
quency to make prediction useful as a preliminary 
to control". (Quoted in 'Essays on the Scientific 
Study of Politics', Ed. H. J. Storing, New York, 
1962. pg. 227, by R. Horwitz). In applying 'a life-
time of study to Ithis intention Lasswell turned 
his back formally upon political philosophy as, to 
quote his words, "metaphysical speculation in 
terms of 'abstractions hopelessly removed from 
empirical observation and control". (quoted from 
Lasswell, 'Power and Society', p. x, Storing, 
op. ciJt. p. 303). FDr him, in fact political philos-
ophy was equivalent to ideology, the classical 
theorists having generally, he 'argued, established 
doctrines in justification of their own po1itical 
preferences. To replace such unscientific formu-
lations Lasswell strove to contribute towards the 
formulation of an all-encompassing scientific 
poLitical theory according to which all social 
structures and the resultant political philosophies 
could be understoDd (ibid. p. 228f,). Yet Lass-
well himself was dedicated to a political ideal: 
he was a man "deeply intent on making Dem-
ocr'acy a workiing inSititution" (Lasswell: The 
Analysis of Political Behaviour, p. vii, London, 
1951), and this confusion left his thought, in the 
words of Ralph Horwitz, " impaled on the horns of 
an irresolvable dilemma". His science became 
manipulative rather than descriptive, it was put to 
the service of propaganda rather than simply to 
a cool analysis of social behaviour, and his care-
less regard for political philosophy as a discipline 
which had formed even his preference so6ems to 
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hav~ left him unaware that he had become, mas,ter 
propagandist though he was, the victim of a subtler 
propaganda than he could invent. (Storing, p. 
303U 
From the point of view of converting political 
studies iIllto a quasi-exact science, then, or of 
establishing model constructs as criteria by which 
to judge real social situations and their political 
consequences Lasswell was a f'ailure. But in other 
ways he, and a whole generation of behavioural 
scholars have in fact made it possible for political 
analysis to reach new depths -and to turn it to 
good purpose in the practical assessment of sooial 
situations by political parties and departments of 
state. They did this by adding a new perspective 
to census-taking, by perfecting methods of opinion 
analysis, and beh-aviouranalysis in authority 
struotures of both informal and formal kinds, as in 
social clubs, in trade unions, in military forces, and 
in state bureaucracies. The results have sometimes 
been star-tling, as for instance to prove wrong by 
empirical verification Marxist prophecies of the 
encreasing proletarianisa;tion of oapitalist society. 
For SOCiety in advanced industrialised countries 
develops highly elaborate authority structures 
which distribute wealth and pOlitical power in 
ways unforeseen by Marx, and which leads in fact 
to a diminishment of the social category which 
Marx identified with the use of the word mass, 
to such a point indeed that the real mass lies 
above it. (Cf. R. Dahrendorf, Class and mass Con-
fiict in Industrial Society, London 1959). Another 
viltal example would do here. It has been a trait 
of many political theorists, prominently amongst 
them in our own time, the Marxists, to suppose 
th3lt by a perfectly just redistribution of wealth 
and power classes would disappear and therefore 
the tensions between them would disappear also, so 
that in due time the whole world would dwell in 
peace as 'all its peoples were habituated to com-
munist norms of social justice. But modern 
behavioural research unhappily proves Aristotle 
ri!l'ht. It is not simply economic factors which 
cause sooial differences,and tensions between 
classes, and violence in society. Authority relaJtion-
ships which even communist society could not 
eliminate 'cause it too; and so do a whole pandoras 
box of human prejudices arising from group 
relationships (e.g. as between peoples of different 
physiological type and skin colour). And though 
it is 'true that 'a good deal 'Of research has traced 
the causes of particular prejudices and made it 
possible to eliminate them by legislation and edu-
cation, yet the situations out of which prejudice 
involuntarily arises, and which can be exploited 
by political manipulators, are not always predic,t-
able and occur in such variety that a general 
control is impossible of achievement. 
The behavioralists have therefore served us well 
in certain directions. 
Not least is challenging many accepted views 
with reg'ard to the traditionally most important 
part of political studies, namely institutions and 
adminis,trative structures. It was often the case 
especially perhaps in countries governed in the 
British tradition, to suppose that ·administrative 
structures w.ere a-political or at any rate were a 
negative factor in the implimentation of political 
policies. One does not have far to seek in history 
to prove ,this assumption wrong, but still too many 
scholars (are content \wiJth descriptive analysis 
based upon constitutional documents or similar 
evidence, and give ,too much credence 'to the as-
sumptionthat bureaucrats, including civil servants, 
are not part of an over-'all .authority structure 
(what the soci'Ologists call an imperatively co-
ordinatedassocia,tion), extending from the highest 
political or decision-making offices down to the 
daily 'routines of the humblest members of society. 
Behavioural studies have proved ,that authority 
roles where-ever exercised in a social group such 
as one may take a nation-st3lte to be, have social 
and political content as well as administrative 
meaning. That is to say, that while the formal 
legal organis3ltion of insti:tutions does institution-
alize the character of human ,behaviour and im-
pose differential functional relationships upon 
people who categorise each otherac·cording to place 
and role in the formal authority hierarchy, at the 
same time, informal human behaviour and indi-
vidual or class expect'ations or desires deriving 
sometimes from sources outside the functional roles 
involved, create tensions within institutions, and 
bring about organic changes in them, which make 
even the most carefully written ·constitutions in-
adequate tools of political analysis. A classic 
example would be the constitutions of the U.S.S.R. 
and of the C.P.S.U., but it affects all institutions. 
(Vide S. K. Bailey, 'New Research Frontiers of 
Interest to Legislators and Administrators' in 
Research Frontiers, Research Frontiers in Politics 
and Government, Brookings Institution, 1955, pg. 
13 ff.) As a consequence the conventional use 
of words like 'executive', 'legislature', 'political 
party' and bureaucracy' in the sense of formal 
crutegories which enable scho·lars to indulge in 
the compara;tive analysis of governments by 
comparing their formal constitutions is now 
recognised to be unscientific. An example would 
be the highly complex considerations which apply 
to the comparison of ministerial cabinets in 
British Commonwealth states, for even the moSIt 
tentative probing must lead one to ·assume that 
they are all different kinds of organisms differently 
articul·aJted to state departments, 'and legislatures, 
and ,to party c'aucases; and equally important 
perhaps, are differently 'reg,arded by the people at 
large whom they govern. Thus new criteria of 
comparison, if oomparisonthere must be, must be 
found. (Vide: D. B. Truman, The Impact on 
Political Sc'ience of the Revolution in the Behavi-
oural Sciences, in Research Frontiers, op. cit. 
Chapter 8,) Nor is this exercise irrelevant, for in 
a world in which inter-governmental co-operation 
and even supra-national instttutions are of in-
creasing importance, the provision of properly 
trained personnel and the development ofa more 
general understanding of the processes of dec'ision-
making and execution are of very great importance. 
Not only in national governments, but in inter-
nrutional organisations, for it becomes clearer that 
a nominally 'a-political secretariat or international 
civil service, as in the U.N., does become what its 
creators so often naively suppose it won't become, 
namely, a positive force in the implimentation of 
policies implicitly as well as explicitly written into 
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the charter or treaty by which the organisation is 
set up. (Vide, UNESCO Report on National Admin-
istration and Intermvtional Organisation, A Com-
parative Survey of Fourteen Countries, Brussels, 
1951.) 
I cannot canvass here, with any hope of success 
the new approaches which are being made, and the 
new principles which are being est,ablished, in the 
study of politics and government. Suffice it so say 
that in many ways political scientists are making 
new maps as significantly different from the old 
as the geographical charts of the world which 
followed the discovery that the earth was a globe 
and not fiat. And their new maps are becoming 
as complex and as differentiated as the geographer's 
and geologists' maps. And so they must, for they 
deal with the whole man, in his whole environ-
ment and with all kinds of men in their kinds of 
environment. Thus there are many specialists 
going under the general name of political sCientists, 
and it is not given to a general practitioner, or 
indeed even to a specialist of one branch of the 
science, to be able to move with equal facility 
through all fields of learning and research in this 
grea1t subject. 
